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Pawlik v. Deng, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 11 (Mar. 1, 2018) (en banc)1
PROPERTY: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Summary
The Court held NRS 271.595 creates two redemption periods; one of two years and one of
60-days. The 60-day notice and redemption period must follow the two-year period and cannot
run concurrently.
Background
Shyan-Fenn Deng and Linda Hsiang-Yu Chiang Deng (the Dengs) are trustees of their
revocable trust. The Dengs defaulted on real property held in the trust which subsequently entered
delinquency. Pawlik then purchased the property on January 27, 2014 at a sale under NFRS
Chapter 271. Almost two years later, on January 7, 2016, Pawlik began serving the Dengs with his
intent to apply for a deed and the upcoming, two year, expiration period on January 27, 2016.
Then, only 47 days after the expiration of the two-year redemption period but 67 days after he
began attempting service, Pawlik on March 14, 2016, applied to the Las Vegas City Treasurer for
a deed. The Treasurer refused, the Dengs paid their delinquency in full on April 6, 2016, and this
suit ensued.
Pawlik filed a complaint to quiet title and a writ of mandamus to which the Dengs replied
with a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and Pawlik appealed the order to
the Nevada Supreme Court which now affirms.
The statute created two separate redemption periods for residential properties; one 60-day
period that begins after notice that the certificate of sale holder is demanding a deed, and another
two-year period that begins after the certificate of sale. The Court determined that the ambiguous
language of NRS 271.595 created an issue as to whether the two redemption periods could run
concurrently or one after another.
Discussion
NRS 271.595(3) creates an additional 60-day notice and redemption period
The lower court concluded that the 60-day redemption notice is an additional time period
and must begin at the end of the two-year redemption period. Because of this, Pawlik had provided
premature and ineffective notice. Thus, the Dengs were able to redeem their property because they
had paid on April 6, 2016 which was less than two years and 60 days from the certificate of sale
date.
Here, the Court held that the statute as a whole contained ambiguity. The Court found that
NRS 271.595(3) was unambiguous and when read plainly was a mandate to the Treasurer to
execute a deed upon the certificate holder fulfilling the requirements of the statute. The Court
admitted that based on provision (3) alone, it seems clear that a certificate holder needed only to
notify the owners of the property at any time after obtaining the certificate of sale.2 NRS
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271.595(3) states that, “No deed may be executed until the holder of the certificate of sale has
notified the owners of the property that he or she holds the certificate, and will demand a deed
therefor.”3
Therefore, the certificate holder would notify them of the intent to demand the deed at the
end of the redemption period of two years. As stated in NRS 271.595(1): “Any property sold for
an assessment . . . is subject to redemption by the former owner . . . at any time within two years .
. . after the date of the certificate of sale.”4 However, ambiguity is created by provision (4) of the
statute because this provision creates an additional redemption period. NRS 271.595(4) states: “If
redemption is not made within 60 days after the date of service, or the date of the first publication
of the notice, as the case may be, the holder of the certificate of sale is entitled to a deed.” 5 This
provision when read with the previous sections of the statute creates unclear language as whether
the end of two redemption periods allow entitlement to the certificate holder of a deed. Thus, the
question the lower court and this Court decided was whether these two redemption periods may
run together or not.
The Court held it was a reasonable interpretation that the entire 60-day notice period could
take place at any time during the 2-year period. This would make a certificate holder immediately
eligible for the deed at the end of the two-year redemption period following the certificate of sale.
However, the Court reasoned that the only way a certificate holder would be entitled to a deed
following the end of the 60-day redemption period would be if the two-year redemption period
was over as well. Any period constraining a certificate holder to a smaller amount of time, such as
the 60-day period, would only make sense in the statute if the longer period had also finished.
Therefore, a reasonable interpretation would also find that subsection (4) could only follow
subsection (1). Thus, the Court found the Cheng’s interpretation of the statute reasonable as well.
Because both interpretations were reasonable, the Court looked beyond the statute to
resolve the ambiguity relying first on relevant case law highlighting proper statutory interpretation.
“[A] statute should not be read in a manner that renders a part of a statute meaningless.”6 And the
meaning of words must parallel the context and spirit of the law itself.7
Next, the Court also looked to the statute as a whole, and NRS Chapter 271 requires
provisions to be interpreted broadly.8 Additionally, the Court looked to the legislative history of
the statute to “construe[] the statute in a manner that conform[ed] to reason and public policy.”9
The Court held that NRS 271.595 was based on similar state statutes from Idaho and Wyoming
and contained language almost exact to Wyoming state law. The Wyoming statute distinguished
between the two periods as lengths of time that could not run concurrently to one another, which
here, agreed with the lower court’s interpretation the NRS 271.595. Finally, the Court looked to
similar statutory language in Nevada which held two redemption periods were to run one after the
other creating additional time for the last known owner of property.10
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NRS 271.595 requires strict compliance
The Court, after it had determined the lower court had not erred, turned to Pawlik’s
argument that his compliance, though not strict, was substantial and as such, the Treasurer’s deed
should have automatically followed the two-year and 60-day period. The Court held that this
argument failed. If Pawlik had correctly followed the timing set forth in the statute then, after the
two-year redemption period, he would have begun his attempts to serve the Dengs with notice.
Then, after the two-year period and following the end of the 60-day period, he would have been
entitled to a deed, and the Treasurer would have been compelled to issue it. Because he provided
premature notice, he was not entitled the deed at all, and the Treasurer was never compelled to
issue one.
A statute may contain mandatory or directory provisions or both.11 A provision is
mandatory when a specific time and manner to perform an act is stated. A provision is directory
when it provides who must act and how but does not specify notice. Here, the Court ultimately
found that the requirements of NRS 271.595 are mandatory; that they require notice and specific
performance. Therefore, the Treasurer was right in requiring strict compliance from Pawlik, and
because he failed to comply with the statute, his notice was ineffective and argument unpersuasive.
Conclusion
The Court in an en banc ruling affirmed the lower courts grant of motion to dismiss. It held
that NRS 271.595(3) and (4) create an additional period of redemption to follow the two-year
found in NRS 271.595(1). Additionally, the Court held that NRS 271.595 requires strict
compliance with the requirements set forth in the statute.
Dissent
The Court in a three-judge dissent argued that there is not ambiguity in the language on
which to place the majority ruling. If a statute is clear on its face, then the Court will look no
further than the statute itself.12 The dissent argued that the statute on its face creates a two-year
redemption period, and the Deng’s argument of an additional 60-day redemption period misreads
the statute altogether.
The purpose of the 60-day period is to measure the time before the Treasurer is compelled
to issue a deed and to, “alert the former owner that the purchaser will seek a deed.” This period is
not meant to create additional time for the previous owner and the, “Deng’s argument ignores the
function and purpose of the notice provision in the statutory scheme.”
Because neither NRS 271.595(3) or (4) of the statute require the 60-day period to begin on
a certain date or in conjunction with another part of the statute the majority fail to show ambiguity
where within the statute at all. Notice could be given and the 60-day period could start before the
two-year period had run, or after. The dissent asserts that it simply is a time period with a separate
purpose of providing at least 60-days of notice. “It would be absurd to conclude that the 60-day
notice given during the two-year statutory redemption period shorts the redemption period, and it
is equally absurd to conclude that the 60-day period is a mandatory extension of the statutory
redemption period.”
11
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The dissent concluded that because neither the majority or lower court explain how the 60day period can only commence subsequent to the two-year period it would reverse the district
court’s order. NRS 271.595(1) contains plain language crating a two-year redemption peioer and
because the Deng’s did not redeem during that period their motion to dismiss fails.
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